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The following is the manuscript of the speech.
Japan and China: Working towards a mature relationship
By Kitamura, Takanori
Consul-General of Japan
1. Japan-China bilateral relations
Some of the issues and phenomena that mark Japan-China relations often give an excessively negative impression of our bilateral ties, which are then often described as "antagonistic" or "deteriorating".
But looking at where Japan-China ties stand now, I see that the overall relationship has not only expanded and strengthened, but that it is also becoming increasingly interdependent.
One of the primary factors indicating the substantial expansion of our relations is the increase in our bilateral trade. In 2005, the total amount of Japan's trade with China, including Hong Kong, reached 227.1 billion US dollars, thus surpassing the amount of Japan-US trade last two years.
A second factor that is also a significant element in the strengthening of our bilateral ties is Japan's active direct investment in China. According to official Chinese statistics, Japanese investments in mainland China amounted to 6.53 billion US dollars last year, an increase of 19.8 percent from the previous year. Of all foreign investment in China excluding tax haven economies, Japan was the second largest investor to China – only next to Hong Kong – last year. The statistics show that the volume of Japanese investment is not only growing, but it is also expanding to new areas. One area of this expansion is investment in non-manufacturing sectors such as retail and other service industries. I expect these investments could be promoted still further if China were to fulfil the pledges it made at the time of its accession to the WTO. Another area is the expansion of our investment in the automobile industry in China, including new investments in Southern China. The automobile industry is a sector that connects to a wide range of related businesses such as components suppliers. Accordingly, I expect Japanese investment will continue a steady, full-scale consolidation.
Third, over four million Chinese and Japanese visited each other's countries in 2005, which represents an increase of 50% in the number of visitors compared with that of 2001. Among these visitors, the number of Chinese tourists to Japan has more than doubled in the last two years. In July 2005, the Japanese government introduced a measure to make it much easier for citizens from all areas of the PRC to visit Japan, when traveling as part of a group tour. This vigorous trend in tourism between the two countries will be further promoted by the implementation of the Japan-China Tourism Exchange Year in 2006.
Japan is preparing to implement "The Japan-China Youth exchange program for 21st century", which will be used to invite Chinese high school students to visit Japan, stay with Japanese families or study in Japan, offering them excellent opportunities to come into contact with Japanese people. The Chinese side also intends to invite Japanese youth to China on a similar program.
The two sides have already reached an agreement to set up a group to jointly study history. Details such as the composition of the group and the objectives are currently being discussed.
On the occasion of the visit of Japanese Minister for Economy, Trade and Industry, Mr. Toshihiro Nikai, to Beijing last month, the two sides agreed to elaborate the details of "The forum on energy efficiency and conservation of environment". The Japanese side expressed its readiness to offer any help in order to address pressing issues involving energy-saving and the environment.
On the diplomatic front, a "comprehensive policy dialogue" at the vice-minister level started last year to discuss various matters of mutual interest. Four rounds of talks have already taken place. In addition to political and economic matters, the dialogue also focused on cultural exchanges and the promotion of personal contacts. The two sides basically agreed to promote tourism in 2006 and to promote cultural and sporting exchanges in 2007.
The year 2007 happens to be the 35th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic ties between Japan and China, and I envisage that a number of activities, including cultural and sporting events, will be organized to jointly celebrate this significant milestone.
2. Japan-China relations since 1972
It is worth looking at the past process of Japan-China relations, which formally started in 1972, because the last 34 years of interaction can not only teach us something about where we stand now but might also indicate where we are heading.
The normalization of ties in 1972 was a dramatic event in diplomacy, which was the result of both historical and strategic needs. In Japan, it caused surprise, attracting both approval and criticism. I would be very much enlightened if I could learn how Chinese people perceived the normalization of ties at that time. In any case, it is especially worthy of note that the two countries established friendly ties despite many differences, both political, social and economic.
After the Cultural Revolution, China started a policy of reform and opening-up in 1978. Japan immediately announced its full support, which then laid the foundation for Japan's foreign policy towards China. From the same year, Japan started to extend official development assistance (ODA) to China, and the amount committed since then totals about 3 trillion yen (or about 200 billion HK dollars). In addition to this ODA, the same amount in soft loans from Japan, equivalent to World Bank loans, has also been extended. Many observers point out that the assistance thus extended from Japan played an important role in the successful process of implementing the reform and opening policy.
It was not just the government that offered friendly and supportive gestures to China. The private sector, including business circles, was even more enthusiastic about supporting the reform and opening policy. Chinese government and research institutions were eager to learn Japanese methods of economic planning and management, and many channels of "mutual learning" were created at official and private levels. Japanese movies were screened widely, attracting a large audience. Thus, the 1980s could be described as a golden decade of Japan-China relations.
Friendly gestures from the Japanese side were also clear even after the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989. Although Japan joined the measures put in place by the international community, it consistently claimed that China should not be isolated. Japan was the first to lift the measures, and in 1991 the Japanese prime minister was the first leader from those countries that initiated measures to pay an official visit to China. Furthermore, the Japanese Emperor and Empress paid a state visit to China in 1992. I was deputy chief of protocol at Tokyo headquarters at that time and personally witnessed the difficult decision-making process in Japan concerning whether or not to accept the Chinese invitation. Those who opposed the decision claimed that Japan-China ties were not yet mature and it was therefore not appropriate to accept the invitation. Despite those opinions, the government finally decided to go ahead with the visit. I still remember that in Shanghai, the third destination on the schedule, an incredible number of people came out to welcome the Emperor and Empress as their motorcade passed through the main streets of Shanghai. I was in the motorcade and observed the people on the streets. They did not appear to have been mobilized or to be under any orders, but were very welcoming and enthusiastic. I thought that the visit would symbolize a long-term friendship in the decades to come.
Japan's friendly posture was maintained throughout the 90s. In the late 90s, accession to the WTO was high on China's diplomatic agenda. China's negotiations with the US reached deadlock in April 1999, while in May of the same year the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was bombed by US planes. Opposition forces to WTO accession inside China were gaining power, while negative views were emerging in Western countries. It was in such circumstances that Japanese Prime Minister Mr Keizo Obuchi visited Beijing in July 1999 and concluded a bilateral agreement on WTO accession, demonstrating Japan's firm support for China's early entry into the WTO.
Now, let us examine what happened in China in the 1990s. The year 1992, when the Emperor and Empress visited China, marked a new stage in the open and reform policy, when Deng Xiaoping's "Southern Tour Speech" (Nanxun Jianghua) really triggered a rapid acceleration of the policy. This resulted in the fast growth of the Chinese economy. At the same time, this rapid economic growth also produced negative consequences – widening gaps, corruption, deteriorating loyalty to the ruling Communist Party, and so on. We saw the Chinese authorities starting to emphasize a patriotic education and the role of the party. Many new "anti-Japanese museums" were built and named "patriotic education bases", while the Communist Party's contribution to the anti-Japanese war was highlighted again. Many Japanese believe that this policy contributed to the consolidation of a certain stereotypical image of Japan among Chinese people.
The state visit to Japan by Chinese leader Mr Jiang Zeming in 1998 was a significant visit during which both governments expressed their resolve to establish a partnership of friendship and cooperation for peace and development. But, this visit also caused a great shock to the Japanese people. By excessively repeating historical issues without any regard for protocol, he triggered a worsening trend in the negative image of China held by the Japanese. And since his visit, I regret to say that we have seen many incidents that have further tarnished the Chinese image – Chinese research vessels illegally conducting missions in Japan's exclusive economic zone, a Chinese submarine illegally navigating in the Japanese territorial waters, outbreaks of anti-Japan fever among soccer fans, Chinese security personnel entering the Japanese consulate in ShengYang to arrest North Korean defectors, vandalism of official Japanese residences and Japanese companies during demonstrations, and so on.
Now, let us look at what has happened in Japan and the consequences for its relationship with China. First, Japan experienced a serious recession throughout the 90s. One of the outcomes of that was that the Japanese felt less confident and became inward-looking. Respect for the Japanese model of development also declined, and the world's attention turned elsewhere. The challenge that Japan faced starting from 1991 until very recent times was one that Japan had never experienced before.
Second, in the 90s, Japan experienced a new challenge in the political arena, which led Japan to start seeking a more proactive role in world affairs. The Gulf War in 1991 prompted Japan to reconsider how it contributes to the maintenance of international peace and order. During that war, Japan made a financial contribution amounting to 13 billion US dollars. That was no small amount, but the fact that there was little contribution in terms of personnel invited international criticism that Japan was shirking a real contribution where it was most needed. Since then, Japan has sought to play a more active political role in the world. The increased participation of Japan's Self-Defense Forces in UN peacekeeping operations and Japan's aspiration to become a permanent member of a reformed and expanded Security Council can be seen in this light. Many in the world vocally welcome Japan's proactive stance. However, you may ask whether such an active posture has gained a good understanding among our closest neighbors.
On the other hand, the rise of China not only in its economic development, but also in its military build-up that has extended over more than a decade without adequate transparency, has attracted world attention and concern. This has also added a new factor to Japan-China relations.
3. People's perception of the other side
Allow me to turn to perceptions and how people on the two sides see each other. The Japanese government conducts a nationwide survey every year on Japan's diplomacy. One of the questions asks whether the respondent likes a particular country. China is one of the countries referred to, and people's responses are worth attention. Throughout the 1970s and 80s, almost 70% of respondents said "yes", with only 15% to 25% saying "no". A change occurred in 1989. The "yes" response dropped to 52%, while the "no" reply increased to 43%. Throughout the 1990s, both the two figures were close, with "yes" slightly overriding "no". In 2003, the two camps were split down the middle, and in the most recent years the "noes" have occupied the majority. Last year, the "noes" were 63% and the "yes's" were 32%.
I cannot find any similar official survey on Chinese perceptions of Japan. So let me quote one "unofficial survey" which asked the question "Do you like Japan?". 75% of respondents answered "no". One other question was "Do you know that Japan has extended economic assistance?". 71% of respondents answered "I do not know".
Let us look at some specific issues to see how they create perception. First, the rise of China. It is hard to grasp the whole picture of a rapidly changing China. Even in the sphere of Chinese economic activities, it has been hard for foreign investors to understand Chinese rules and policies. Now China has entered the WTO and accepted global standards, and this has greatly improved transparency. We expect China's smooth and successful compliance with global standards, including protection of intellectual property rights.
On the other hand, we still see that China's military build-up lacks transparency. I cannot specify how much this state of affairs has affected Japanese perceptions in the survey I just mentioned, but I assume that many Japanese hold a certain anxiety. This kind of Japanese anxiety may well create the suspicion in Chinese eyes that Japan will seek to contain China's development.
Japan's active diplomacy in the political arena in the 1990s and onward might have added to negative impressions of Japan. I say this because we have never failed to hear official comments of a negative nature highlighting an alleged revival of militarism and glorification of past invasions, etc. These comments are also made in connection with other issues, too, so that they seem to be interrelated and are not solely made on the issue of Japan's diplomacy that I am talking about.
Allow me to touch on the issue of the Yasukuni shrine. This issue has become a highly sensitive political matter and does involve national sentiments. Nevertheless, I believe it is worth discussing here. The Chinese side claims that the Japanese Prime Minister visits the Yasukuni shrine to worship class A war criminals, and that this will lead down the path to a revival of militarism and glorification of past aggression.
Opinions on the prime minister's visits to Yasukuni shrine are divided in Japan. However, I must clarify one thing : prime minister Koizumi does not visit the shrine to worship class A war criminals or to revise the militarism of the past, He visits the shrine to mourn for those who sacrificed their lives during the war. In addition to the above controversy on the objectives of the visit, I believe it worth mentioning that the shrine is purely a private entity where the names of the war dead, including those war criminals, are registered. This information may not fully address the Chinese claims, but they should serve to narrow the perception gap.
The issue of school textbooks is another issue that is often referred to. We first need to admit that it is not easy for different countries to reach a common interpretation on historical matters. I personally hold great expectations that the Japan-China joint study on history that I mentioned at the outset will find some common ground that can help bridge the perception gap between the two sides.
With regard to history textbooks used in Japanese junior high and high schools, these are revised every four years and the contents of the books are always the subject of thorough discussion. I do recommend to you to read and check for yourselves how these junior high school textbooks relate the historical facts. Relevant parts of all the junior high school history textbooks have now been translated into Chinese, and you can find the translations through the website of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. You will discover that all the history textbooks in my country describe Japan's wartime atrocities. I therefore urge you to do your homework before coming to your own perception.
While talking about this issue, I would like to make a brief comment on Chinese textbooks. Any textbook needs to provide a balanced picture, and I wish Chinese students will have a fair opportunity, through their textbooks, to come to know Japan's post-war achievements as it has built a peace-loving and democratic society. I believe that a balanced picture will also narrow the perception gap.
4. Way ahead for a mature relationship
A mature diplomacy can only exist when it is found on mature knowledge and support at the mass level. I want to emphasize that we should encourage people on both sides to gain accurate, fair and balanced knowledge of each other. I mentioned at the outset several measures that are being undertaken, all of which are contributing towards this end.
Take tourism for instance. I envisage the current level of mutual visits, which stands at 4 million visits so far, will soon double. But that figure is still not enough when compared to the whole population. We should encourage more opportunities for mutual contacts, so that more Japanese and Chinese will get to know each other and our respective societies. The youth exchange program that is to be promoted on an official basis by both sides will surely provide young Chinese and Japanese people with good opportunities to learn about each other.
The path that will lead us to mutual understanding and the acquisition of a fair and balanced picture is not an easy one, but I strongly urge both sides to pursue it. I hold a long-term conviction that Japanese people should learn more about pre-war China and Chinese people should learn more about post-war Japan.
Looking back at Japan-China relations of the last 34 years, we need to realize that the structure of our bilateral relations has undergone a dramatic transformation. In terms of our economies, the old structure in which Japan unilaterally extended assistance and China learned the principles of the market economy has been transformed into one that combines two economic giants. Chinese GDP is still expanding at a high speed, and many observers estimate that it will soon or later outgrow Japan's and then even that of the US.
But Japan welcomes the economic rise of China, with Prime Minister Koizumi making crystal clear in 2001 that it is not a threat but an opportunity. We are good economic partners who benefit each other. The Japanese side is encouraged by Chinese efforts to comply with global standards set by WTO, although consistent efforts are yet to be made in areas such as the protection of intellectual property rights. The way ahead is transparent, and although issues may arise from time to time, they can be solved within the framework of rules and regulations that the two sides share.
In the political arena, the change of structure is more eye-catching. An economic giant with military expenditure expanding at a faster speed than its economic growth has emerged in this region. This poses a big question – how does China find its position in the existing political and economic order of this region? And conversely, how do the other countries in this region accommodate the rise of China?
I would welcome China to play a constructive and responsible role in this region. At the same time, I hope that China will abide by the international standards of transparency in regard to military expenditure and policy.
Japan's active diplomacy in the political arena since the 1990s also needs to be well accommodated in this region. We welcome closer dialogue, and the "comprehensive political dialogue" I mentioned at the outset is one such effort to which our two sides have attached great importance.
With all this in mind, I am basically optimistic on future Japan-China relations. I briefly touched at the outset on the current state of the relations, which provide a reasonably good basis for being optimistic.
Trade and investment constitute important parts of our ties and are already built in as an integral part of both economies. Mutual visits and contacts, which I expect will grow rapidly, will bring together people on both sides and nurture better understanding of each other. The two governments have clearly recognized that mutual contacts and communication between our peoples should be enhanced by all possible means.
We also need to see Japan-China relations from regional and global perspectives. These two economic giants naturally bear a major responsibility for the stability and prosperity of this region. The leaders of both sides have repeatedly expressed the idea of cooperative engagement. It is a requirement for this region that the two countries work cooperatively and play a constructive role together.
How do two countries expand their joint interests and the advantages that they have in common? How do we nurture a better understanding among and between their peoples? How do we accommodate their economic and political powers in the existing regional order? How do we manage the issue of history? Those are just some of the major challenges before us. We really need to address all of these issues in parallel.
The history issue is a sensitive one related to people's feelings. A few minutes ago I urged my people to make more of an effort to learn about pre-war China and Chinese people to do the same about post-war Japan. I believe that such continuous efforts could serve as a good basis for reconciliation. We need to handle the history issue carefully, but I find it inappropriate that the history issue is set as a precondition for addressing issues in other areas.
Now, let us think how and what the two sides can contribute to this region. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration adopted at the East Asia Summit held last December in Malaysia gives us an inspiring hint. The declaration agreed by 16 leaders of this region calls for the fostering of a strategic dialogue, the promotion of further cooperation in political and security issues and the promotion of development, financial stability, energy security and economic integration, etc. In addressing such issues, the declaration urges the countries to strengthen the application of global standards and universally recognized values. It is my sincere hope but also my sincere belief that China and Japan will succeed in developing a mature relationship in which both of us strive together to address the challenges we all face in this region.
Finally, I would like to mention a survey on Japan-China relations conducted recently by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
The first question was, "Do our two countries understand each other?" 19.0% replied that "Japan understands China, but China does not understand Japan". 2.3% replied "China understands Japan, but Japan does not understand China". 62.4% said "Neither side understands the other."
The second question was "Should we improve relations?" 77.9% replied "Yes, we should improve relations."
With this strong message from our people, let me conclude today's lecture.
Thank you.
For photos please click in http://www.hku.hk/hkumedia/ and check icon "Events" under "Photo Gallery"
Japanese Consul-General Spoke on Sino-Japanese Relations
12 Apr 2006
The Consul-General of Japan, Mr Takanori Kitamura, spoke on the Sino-Japanese relations in a lecture jointly organised by the Department of Japanese Studies and the Centre of Asian Studies of HKU today (April 12).
The following is the manuscript of the speech.
Japan and China: Working towards a mature relationship
By Kitamura, Takanori
Consul-General of Japan
1. Japan-China bilateral relations
Some of the issues and phenomena that mark Japan-China relations often give an excessively negative impression of our bilateral ties, which are then often described as "antagonistic" or "deteriorating".
But looking at where Japan-China ties stand now, I see that the overall relationship has not only expanded and strengthened, but that it is also becoming increasingly interdependent.
One of the primary factors indicating the substantial expansion of our relations is the increase in our bilateral trade. In 2005, the total amount of Japan's trade with China, including Hong Kong, reached 227.1 billion US dollars, thus surpassing the amount of Japan-US trade last two years.
A second factor that is also a significant element in the strengthening of our bilateral ties is Japan's active direct investment in China. According to official Chinese statistics, Japanese investments in mainland China amounted to 6.53 billion US dollars last year, an increase of 19.8 percent from the previous year. Of all foreign investment in China excluding tax haven economies, Japan was the second largest investor to China – only next to Hong Kong – last year. The statistics show that the volume of Japanese investment is not only growing, but it is also expanding to new areas. One area of this expansion is investment in non-manufacturing sectors such as retail and other service industries. I expect these investments could be promoted still further if China were to fulfil the pledges it made at the time of its accession to the WTO. Another area is the expansion of our investment in the automobile industry in China, including new investments in Southern China. The automobile industry is a sector that connects to a wide range of related businesses such as components suppliers. Accordingly, I expect Japanese investment will continue a steady, full-scale consolidation.
Third, over four million Chinese and Japanese visited each other's countries in 2005, which represents an increase of 50% in the number of visitors compared with that of 2001. Among these visitors, the number of Chinese tourists to Japan has more than doubled in the last two years. In July 2005, the Japanese government introduced a measure to make it much easier for citizens from all areas of the PRC to visit Japan, when traveling as part of a group tour. This vigorous trend in tourism between the two countries will be further promoted by the implementation of the Japan-China Tourism Exchange Year in 2006.
Japan is preparing to implement "The Japan-China Youth exchange program for 21st century", which will be used to invite Chinese high school students to visit Japan, stay with Japanese families or study in Japan, offering them excellent opportunities to come into contact with Japanese people. The Chinese side also intends to invite Japanese youth to China on a similar program.
The two sides have already reached an agreement to set up a group to jointly study history. Details such as the composition of the group and the objectives are currently being discussed.
On the occasion of the visit of Japanese Minister for Economy, Trade and Industry, Mr. Toshihiro Nikai, to Beijing last month, the two sides agreed to elaborate the details of "The forum on energy efficiency and conservation of environment". The Japanese side expressed its readiness to offer any help in order to address pressing issues involving energy-saving and the environment.
On the diplomatic front, a "comprehensive policy dialogue" at the vice-minister level started last year to discuss various matters of mutual interest. Four rounds of talks have already taken place. In addition to political and economic matters, the dialogue also focused on cultural exchanges and the promotion of personal contacts. The two sides basically agreed to promote tourism in 2006 and to promote cultural and sporting exchanges in 2007.
The year 2007 happens to be the 35th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic ties between Japan and China, and I envisage that a number of activities, including cultural and sporting events, will be organized to jointly celebrate this significant milestone.
2. Japan-China relations since 1972
It is worth looking at the past process of Japan-China relations, which formally started in 1972, because the last 34 years of interaction can not only teach us something about where we stand now but might also indicate where we are heading.
The normalization of ties in 1972 was a dramatic event in diplomacy, which was the result of both historical and strategic needs. In Japan, it caused surprise, attracting both approval and criticism. I would be very much enlightened if I could learn how Chinese people perceived the normalization of ties at that time. In any case, it is especially worthy of note that the two countries established friendly ties despite many differences, both political, social and economic.
After the Cultural Revolution, China started a policy of reform and opening-up in 1978. Japan immediately announced its full support, which then laid the foundation for Japan's foreign policy towards China. From the same year, Japan started to extend official development assistance (ODA) to China, and the amount committed since then totals about 3 trillion yen (or about 200 billion HK dollars). In addition to this ODA, the same amount in soft loans from Japan, equivalent to World Bank loans, has also been extended. Many observers point out that the assistance thus extended from Japan played an important role in the successful process of implementing the reform and opening policy.
It was not just the government that offered friendly and supportive gestures to China. The private sector, including business circles, was even more enthusiastic about supporting the reform and opening policy. Chinese government and research institutions were eager to learn Japanese methods of economic planning and management, and many channels of "mutual learning" were created at official and private levels. Japanese movies were screened widely, attracting a large audience. Thus, the 1980s could be described as a golden decade of Japan-China relations.
Friendly gestures from the Japanese side were also clear even after the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989. Although Japan joined the measures put in place by the international community, it consistently claimed that China should not be isolated. Japan was the first to lift the measures, and in 1991 the Japanese prime minister was the first leader from those countries that initiated measures to pay an official visit to China. Furthermore, the Japanese Emperor and Empress paid a state visit to China in 1992. I was deputy chief of protocol at Tokyo headquarters at that time and personally witnessed the difficult decision-making process in Japan concerning whether or not to accept the Chinese invitation. Those who opposed the decision claimed that Japan-China ties were not yet mature and it was therefore not appropriate to accept the invitation. Despite those opinions, the government finally decided to go ahead with the visit. I still remember that in Shanghai, the third destination on the schedule, an incredible number of people came out to welcome the Emperor and Empress as their motorcade passed through the main streets of Shanghai. I was in the motorcade and observed the people on the streets. They did not appear to have been mobilized or to be under any orders, but were very welcoming and enthusiastic. I thought that the visit would symbolize a long-term friendship in the decades to come.
Japan's friendly posture was maintained throughout the 90s. In the late 90s, accession to the WTO was high on China's diplomatic agenda. China's negotiations with the US reached deadlock in April 1999, while in May of the same year the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was bombed by US planes. Opposition forces to WTO accession inside China were gaining power, while negative views were emerging in Western countries. It was in such circumstances that Japanese Prime Minister Mr Keizo Obuchi visited Beijing in July 1999 and concluded a bilateral agreement on WTO accession, demonstrating Japan's firm support for China's early entry into the WTO.
Now, let us examine what happened in China in the 1990s. The year 1992, when the Emperor and Empress visited China, marked a new stage in the open and reform policy, when Deng Xiaoping's "Southern Tour Speech" (Nanxun Jianghua) really triggered a rapid acceleration of the policy. This resulted in the fast growth of the Chinese economy. At the same time, this rapid economic growth also produced negative consequences – widening gaps, corruption, deteriorating loyalty to the ruling Communist Party, and so on. We saw the Chinese authorities starting to emphasize a patriotic education and the role of the party. Many new "anti-Japanese museums" were built and named "patriotic education bases", while the Communist Party's contribution to the anti-Japanese war was highlighted again. Many Japanese believe that this policy contributed to the consolidation of a certain stereotypical image of Japan among Chinese people.
The state visit to Japan by Chinese leader Mr Jiang Zeming in 1998 was a significant visit during which both governments expressed their resolve to establish a partnership of friendship and cooperation for peace and development. But, this visit also caused a great shock to the Japanese people. By excessively repeating historical issues without any regard for protocol, he triggered a worsening trend in the negative image of China held by the Japanese. And since his visit, I regret to say that we have seen many incidents that have further tarnished the Chinese image – Chinese research vessels illegally conducting missions in Japan's exclusive economic zone, a Chinese submarine illegally navigating in the Japanese territorial waters, outbreaks of anti-Japan fever among soccer fans, Chinese security personnel entering the Japanese consulate in ShengYang to arrest North Korean defectors, vandalism of official Japanese residences and Japanese companies during demonstrations, and so on.
Now, let us look at what has happened in Japan and the consequences for its relationship with China. First, Japan experienced a serious recession throughout the 90s. One of the outcomes of that was that the Japanese felt less confident and became inward-looking. Respect for the Japanese model of development also declined, and the world's attention turned elsewhere. The challenge that Japan faced starting from 1991 until very recent times was one that Japan had never experienced before.
Second, in the 90s, Japan experienced a new challenge in the political arena, which led Japan to start seeking a more proactive role in world affairs. The Gulf War in 1991 prompted Japan to reconsider how it contributes to the maintenance of international peace and order. During that war, Japan made a financial contribution amounting to 13 billion US dollars. That was no small amount, but the fact that there was little contribution in terms of personnel invited international criticism that Japan was shirking a real contribution where it was most needed. Since then, Japan has sought to play a more active political role in the world. The increased participation of Japan's Self-Defense Forces in UN peacekeeping operations and Japan's aspiration to become a permanent member of a reformed and expanded Security Council can be seen in this light. Many in the world vocally welcome Japan's proactive stance. However, you may ask whether such an active posture has gained a good understanding among our closest neighbors.
On the other hand, the rise of China not only in its economic development, but also in its military build-up that has extended over more than a decade without adequate transparency, has attracted world attention and concern. This has also added a new factor to Japan-China relations.
3. People's perception of the other side
Allow me to turn to perceptions and how people on the two sides see each other. The Japanese government conducts a nationwide survey every year on Japan's diplomacy. One of the questions asks whether the respondent likes a particular country. China is one of the countries referred to, and people's responses are worth attention. Throughout the 1970s and 80s, almost 70% of respondents said "yes", with only 15% to 25% saying "no". A change occurred in 1989. The "yes" response dropped to 52%, while the "no" reply increased to 43%. Throughout the 1990s, both the two figures were close, with "yes" slightly overriding "no". In 2003, the two camps were split down the middle, and in the most recent years the "noes" have occupied the majority. Last year, the "noes" were 63% and the "yes's" were 32%.
I cannot find any similar official survey on Chinese perceptions of Japan. So let me quote one "unofficial survey" which asked the question "Do you like Japan?". 75% of respondents answered "no". One other question was "Do you know that Japan has extended economic assistance?". 71% of respondents answered "I do not know".
Let us look at some specific issues to see how they create perception. First, the rise of China. It is hard to grasp the whole picture of a rapidly changing China. Even in the sphere of Chinese economic activities, it has been hard for foreign investors to understand Chinese rules and policies. Now China has entered the WTO and accepted global standards, and this has greatly improved transparency. We expect China's smooth and successful compliance with global standards, including protection of intellectual property rights.
On the other hand, we still see that China's military build-up lacks transparency. I cannot specify how much this state of affairs has affected Japanese perceptions in the survey I just mentioned, but I assume that many Japanese hold a certain anxiety. This kind of Japanese anxiety may well create the suspicion in Chinese eyes that Japan will seek to contain China's development.
Japan's active diplomacy in the political arena in the 1990s and onward might have added to negative impressions of Japan. I say this because we have never failed to hear official comments of a negative nature highlighting an alleged revival of militarism and glorification of past invasions, etc. These comments are also made in connection with other issues, too, so that they seem to be interrelated and are not solely made on the issue of Japan's diplomacy that I am talking about.
Allow me to touch on the issue of the Yasukuni shrine. This issue has become a highly sensitive political matter and does involve national sentiments. Nevertheless, I believe it is worth discussing here. The Chinese side claims that the Japanese Prime Minister visits the Yasukuni shrine to worship class A war criminals, and that this will lead down the path to a revival of militarism and glorification of past aggression.
Opinions on the prime minister's visits to Yasukuni shrine are divided in Japan. However, I must clarify one thing : prime minister Koizumi does not visit the shrine to worship class A war criminals or to revise the militarism of the past, He visits the shrine to mourn for those who sacrificed their lives during the war. In addition to the above controversy on the objectives of the visit, I believe it worth mentioning that the shrine is purely a private entity where the names of the war dead, including those war criminals, are registered. This information may not fully address the Chinese claims, but they should serve to narrow the perception gap.
The issue of school textbooks is another issue that is often referred to. We first need to admit that it is not easy for different countries to reach a common interpretation on historical matters. I personally hold great expectations that the Japan-China joint study on history that I mentioned at the outset will find some common ground that can help bridge the perception gap between the two sides.
With regard to history textbooks used in Japanese junior high and high schools, these are revised every four years and the contents of the books are always the subject of thorough discussion. I do recommend to you to read and check for yourselves how these junior high school textbooks relate the historical facts. Relevant parts of all the junior high school history textbooks have now been translated into Chinese, and you can find the translations through the website of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. You will discover that all the history textbooks in my country describe Japan's wartime atrocities. I therefore urge you to do your homework before coming to your own perception.
While talking about this issue, I would like to make a brief comment on Chinese textbooks. Any textbook needs to provide a balanced picture, and I wish Chinese students will have a fair opportunity, through their textbooks, to come to know Japan's post-war achievements as it has built a peace-loving and democratic society. I believe that a balanced picture will also narrow the perception gap.
4. Way ahead for a mature relationship
A mature diplomacy can only exist when it is found on mature knowledge and support at the mass level. I want to emphasize that we should encourage people on both sides to gain accurate, fair and balanced knowledge of each other. I mentioned at the outset several measures that are being undertaken, all of which are contributing towards this end.
Take tourism for instance. I envisage the current level of mutual visits, which stands at 4 million visits so far, will soon double. But that figure is still not enough when compared to the whole population. We should encourage more opportunities for mutual contacts, so that more Japanese and Chinese will get to know each other and our respective societies. The youth exchange program that is to be promoted on an official basis by both sides will surely provide young Chinese and Japanese people with good opportunities to learn about each other.
The path that will lead us to mutual understanding and the acquisition of a fair and balanced picture is not an easy one, but I strongly urge both sides to pursue it. I hold a long-term conviction that Japanese people should learn more about pre-war China and Chinese people should learn more about post-war Japan.
Looking back at Japan-China relations of the last 34 years, we need to realize that the structure of our bilateral relations has undergone a dramatic transformation. In terms of our economies, the old structure in which Japan unilaterally extended assistance and China learned the principles of the market economy has been transformed into one that combines two economic giants. Chinese GDP is still expanding at a high speed, and many observers estimate that it will soon or later outgrow Japan's and then even that of the US.
But Japan welcomes the economic rise of China, with Prime Minister Koizumi making crystal clear in 2001 that it is not a threat but an opportunity. We are good economic partners who benefit each other. The Japanese side is encouraged by Chinese efforts to comply with global standards set by WTO, although consistent efforts are yet to be made in areas such as the protection of intellectual property rights. The way ahead is transparent, and although issues may arise from time to time, they can be solved within the framework of rules and regulations that the two sides share.
In the political arena, the change of structure is more eye-catching. An economic giant with military expenditure expanding at a faster speed than its economic growth has emerged in this region. This poses a big question – how does China find its position in the existing political and economic order of this region? And conversely, how do the other countries in this region accommodate the rise of China?
I would welcome China to play a constructive and responsible role in this region. At the same time, I hope that China will abide by the international standards of transparency in regard to military expenditure and policy.
Japan's active diplomacy in the political arena since the 1990s also needs to be well accommodated in this region. We welcome closer dialogue, and the "comprehensive political dialogue" I mentioned at the outset is one such effort to which our two sides have attached great importance.
With all this in mind, I am basically optimistic on future Japan-China relations. I briefly touched at the outset on the current state of the relations, which provide a reasonably good basis for being optimistic.
Trade and investment constitute important parts of our ties and are already built in as an integral part of both economies. Mutual visits and contacts, which I expect will grow rapidly, will bring together people on both sides and nurture better understanding of each other. The two governments have clearly recognized that mutual contacts and communication between our peoples should be enhanced by all possible means.
We also need to see Japan-China relations from regional and global perspectives. These two economic giants naturally bear a major responsibility for the stability and prosperity of this region. The leaders of both sides have repeatedly expressed the idea of cooperative engagement. It is a requirement for this region that the two countries work cooperatively and play a constructive role together.
How do two countries expand their joint interests and the advantages that they have in common? How do we nurture a better understanding among and between their peoples? How do we accommodate their economic and political powers in the existing regional order? How do we manage the issue of history? Those are just some of the major challenges before us. We really need to address all of these issues in parallel.
The history issue is a sensitive one related to people's feelings. A few minutes ago I urged my people to make more of an effort to learn about pre-war China and Chinese people to do the same about post-war Japan. I believe that such continuous efforts could serve as a good basis for reconciliation. We need to handle the history issue carefully, but I find it inappropriate that the history issue is set as a precondition for addressing issues in other areas.
Now, let us think how and what the two sides can contribute to this region. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration adopted at the East Asia Summit held last December in Malaysia gives us an inspiring hint. The declaration agreed by 16 leaders of this region calls for the fostering of a strategic dialogue, the promotion of further cooperation in political and security issues and the promotion of development, financial stability, energy security and economic integration, etc. In addressing such issues, the declaration urges the countries to strengthen the application of global standards and universally recognized values. It is my sincere hope but also my sincere belief that China and Japan will succeed in developing a mature relationship in which both of us strive together to address the challenges we all face in this region.
Finally, I would like to mention a survey on Japan-China relations conducted recently by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
The first question was, "Do our two countries understand each other?" 19.0% replied that "Japan understands China, but China does not understand Japan". 2.3% replied "China understands Japan, but Japan does not understand China". 62.4% said "Neither side understands the other."
The second question was "Should we improve relations?" 77.9% replied "Yes, we should improve relations."
With this strong message from our people, let me conclude today's lecture.
Thank you.
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