Media
Back
(a) The probable cause of SARS (coronavirus) was now clear, but its mode of transmission was not fully understood. Droplet and person-to-person transmission were obvious candidates, but not necessarily the only possibilities.
(b) The Hong Kong public health authorities had taken the correct steps to deal with the local SARS outbreak, including rapidly identifying potential patients and their contacts; isolating and taking care of them; taking steps to protect health care workers; and conducting research to further characterize the disease. Only with hindsight was it possible to argue that more might have been done earlier. The important thing now was to make full use of the information obtained since the disease first emerged in Hong Kong.
(c) With reference to the HKSAR Government's report on the Amoy Gardens SARS cases, transmission through sewage was an interesting hypothesis, and should certainly be investigated further, but it was not the only possibility, and other possible modes of transmission should be explored.
(d) It was too early to say that SARS was likely to affect some areas more than others. It had so far been more severe in Canada than the United States, but the two countries had similar health care systems, and it was by no means certain that the United States would remain relatively untouched for long.
(e) The efficacy of antiviral medication, a popular mode of treatment in Hong Kong, was not yet proven. Doctors were anxious to try out a range of treatments in search of a cure, and perhaps the most positive thing the health authorities could do in this respect was to conduct controlled randomized studies with the aim of identifying the most promising modes of treatment. However, he noted that this might be difficult to do in Hong Kong because its citizens had certain expectations of the kind of treatment they should receive.
(f) It was impossible to say whether SARS was becoming less virulent in Hong Kong, but he would be surprised if that were the case. It might infect other countries. It might be a seasonal disease. We just didn’t know at this stage. However, it was unrealistic to expect the early eradication of SARS. Suppressing and minimizing the disease was probably the most that could be expected.
(g) SARS was frightening because it was new, invisible, difficult to detect at an early stage, and had a relatively high fatality rate.
(h) The relative proneness of health care workers to SARS infection should be investigated further, to see if useful lessons can be learned and working procedures possibly improved.
Dr Koplan has been invited by the University of Hong Kong to share his views on the SARS outbreak and ways of dealing with it with staff of the university.
Dr. J. P. Koplan held Press Conference at HKU on SARS
25 Apr 2003
A press conference was held at the University of Hong Kong at 3 p.m. on Friday, 25 April, 2003 at which Dr Jeffrey P. Koplan, former Director of the Center for Disease Control, gave his views on the current SARS outbreak. Dr Koplan was introduced by Professor C. F. Lee, and in his initial statement stressed that much still remained unknown about the SARS disease and that it was impossible to predict its future pattern. In the subsequent question-and-answer session, he made the following points:
(a) The probable cause of SARS (coronavirus) was now clear, but its mode of transmission was not fully understood. Droplet and person-to-person transmission were obvious candidates, but not necessarily the only possibilities.
(b) The Hong Kong public health authorities had taken the correct steps to deal with the local SARS outbreak, including rapidly identifying potential patients and their contacts; isolating and taking care of them; taking steps to protect health care workers; and conducting research to further characterize the disease. Only with hindsight was it possible to argue that more might have been done earlier. The important thing now was to make full use of the information obtained since the disease first emerged in Hong Kong.
(c) With reference to the HKSAR Government's report on the Amoy Gardens SARS cases, transmission through sewage was an interesting hypothesis, and should certainly be investigated further, but it was not the only possibility, and other possible modes of transmission should be explored.
(d) It was too early to say that SARS was likely to affect some areas more than others. It had so far been more severe in Canada than the United States, but the two countries had similar health care systems, and it was by no means certain that the United States would remain relatively untouched for long.
(e) The efficacy of antiviral medication, a popular mode of treatment in Hong Kong, was not yet proven. Doctors were anxious to try out a range of treatments in search of a cure, and perhaps the most positive thing the health authorities could do in this respect was to conduct controlled randomized studies with the aim of identifying the most promising modes of treatment. However, he noted that this might be difficult to do in Hong Kong because its citizens had certain expectations of the kind of treatment they should receive.
(f) It was impossible to say whether SARS was becoming less virulent in Hong Kong, but he would be surprised if that were the case. It might infect other countries. It might be a seasonal disease. We just didn’t know at this stage. However, it was unrealistic to expect the early eradication of SARS. Suppressing and minimizing the disease was probably the most that could be expected.
(g) SARS was frightening because it was new, invisible, difficult to detect at an early stage, and had a relatively high fatality rate.
(h) The relative proneness of health care workers to SARS infection should be investigated further, to see if useful lessons can be learned and working procedures possibly improved.
Dr Koplan has been invited by the University of Hong Kong to share his views on the SARS outbreak and ways of dealing with it with staff of the university.
Facebook 
HKU IOS App 
HKU Android App 
Social Media and Apps